Posted on info security magazine, April 7 by Raz Rafaeli
Relying on a single measure of security – whether it’s to launch nuclear missiles or to protect IT infrastructure – is dangerous, which is why the military long ago instituted the ‘two person rule’, to prevent accidental or malicious launch of nuclear weapons
The world came this close to nuclear annihilation in 1983 – and may well have been saved by Stanislav Petrov, the duty officer at the command center for the Soviet Union’s Oko nuclear early-warning system.
Petrov decided not to pass on information of what appeared to be an American nuclear attack that appeared in his early warning system, because it just didn’t feel right. There were five missiles supposedly on the way, and the early-warning system was new enough that Petrov didn’t trust it he told the BBC in a recent interview.
Relying on a single measure of security – whether it’s to launch nuclear missiles or to protect IT infrastructure – is dangerous, which is why the military long ago instituted the ‘two person rule’, to prevent accidental or malicious launch of nuclear weapons. To launch a nuclear missile under a two person scheme, two operators must agree that an order is valid by comparing an authorization code within the order against that in a sealed envelope, kept in a safe that is opened by both. If the code does match, both operators need to insert their keys into a control panel that launches the missiles themselves…
